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 5 
Changes in Public and Private Sector Pay Structures 
in Two Emerging Market Economies during the Crisis 
 
Abstract: 
This paper estimates public-private sector wage differentials in two emerging market 
economies - Croatia and Serbia - between 2008 and 2011 in order to understand changes 
in the gap resulting from austerity measures undertaken by each sector. The paper focuses 
on counterfactual decompositions of the wage gap at the mean and at selected quantiles 
along the wage distribution, performed using an extension to the Oaxaca-Blinder method 
based on Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regressions and reweighting. The main 
results indicate that there was a wage premium in the public sector for both countries and 
in both years. Although the total wage gap decreased in Serbia during the crisis, the wage 
structure effect, or the returns to workers’ characteristics, increased in both countries. The 
paper shows that the private sector in both countries adjusted wages relative to the public 
sector more at the bottom than at the top of the wage distribution, which led to an 
increase in the relative public sector wage compression, especially in Croatia. While in 
Croatia the wage gaps stemming from differences between the public and private sector in 
the returns to characteristics for similar workers were within the range usually estimated for 
EU countries, these gaps were considerably higher in the case of Serbia. 
 
Keywords: public-private wage gap, recession, unconditional quantile regression, 
recentered influence function, decomposition, Croatia, Serbia 
JEL classification: H3, J31, J33, J45, P2, P3 
 
 
Promjene u strukturi plaæa u javnom i privatnom sektoru 
u dva trišna gospodarstva u nastajanju tijekom krize 
 
Saetak: 
U radu se analiziraju razlike u plaæama izmeðu javnog i privatnog sektora za dva trišna 
gospodarstva u nastajanju - Hrvatsku i Srbiju - u 2008. i 2011. godini, s ciljem 
razumijevanja promjena do kojih je došlo uslijed mjera štednje poduzetih u dva sektora. 
Rad se usredotoèuje na protuèinjeniène dekompozicije razlika u prosjeènim plaæama te na 
razlike izmeðu odabranih kvantila du distribucije, koristeæi ekstenziju metode Oaxace i 
Blindera koja se temelji na reponderiranju i regresijama za bezuvjetne kvantile (RIF 
regresije). Glavni rezultati pokazuju da postoji pozitivna premija na plaæe u javnom sektoru 
za obje zemlje i za obje godine. Iako se ukupni jaz smanjio tijekom krize u Srbiji, razlika u 
graniènim povratima na karakteristike sliènih zaposlenika u obje se zemlje poveæala. U radu 
se pokazuje da je privatni sektor, u odnosu na javni, prilagodio plaæe više na donjem nego 
na gornjem dijelu distribucije u obje zemlje, što je dovelo do relativnog poveæanja 
kompresije plaæa u javnom sektoru, posebice u Hrvatskoj. Dok je u Hrvatskoj jaz u plaæama 
koji proizlazi iz razlika izmeðu javnog i privatnog sektora u povratima na karakteristike za 
radnike usporedive po karakteristikama bio unutar uobièajenog raspona procjena za zemlje 
EU-a, u Srbiji je on bio znatno veæi. 
 
Kljuène rijeèi: jaz plaæa izmeðu javnog i privatnog sektora, recesija, regresija za bezuvjetne 
kvantile, recentrirana funkcija utjecaja, dekompozicija, Hrvatska, Srbija 
JEL klasifikacija: H3, J31, J33, J45, P2, P3 
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1 Introduction1 
 
The global financial and economic crisis which started in 2007/2008 has brought 
difficulties in both public and private sectors worldwide. In a situation of output 
contraction and reduced aggregate demand, many countries have accumulated sizeable 
stocks of public and private debt. The consequent needs for deleveraging have threatened 
and continue to threaten the prospects for a successful recovery. In such circumstances, 
state administrations and both public and private enterprises have pursued, with more or 
less success, a variety of austerity policies. Given that wage bills constitute a lion’s share 
of public expenditures and business costs, the austerity measures in both sectors have 
largely been focused on attempts at reducing them. As a result, public as well as private 
sector wages and employment have been affected by these circumstances, though not 
always to the same extent. 
 
The importance of employment and compensation issues for successful adjustment in 
crisis circumstances, especially in the public sector, has been addressed mainly in the 
macroeconomic literature. For instance, Hernandez de Cos and Moral-Benito (2013) 
show, by using a panel of OECD countries over the 1980-2007 period, that the public 
sector wage bill plays a crucial role in achieving growth-promoting budget consolidation 
requirements and improvements of overall competitiveness of the economy via public-
private sector wages causality. Similarly, for 18 OECD countries over the 1970-2006 
period, Lamo, Perez and Schuknect (2012) find co-movements between public and private 
sector wages, while Lamo, Perez and Schuknect (2013) estimate strong positive correlation 
between public and private sector wages over the business cycle. Another strand of studies 
examined correlations between public and private sector employment. For example, 
Behar and Mok (2013), using a large cross-section of developing and advanced countries, 
find evidence that public employment crowds out private employment, while Algan, 
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2002) find that public sector crowds out total employment if 
public sector wages are high and/or when the goods produced by the two sectors are 
substitutes. 
 
On the other hand, only a few microeconomic studies attempted to explain differences in 
the public-private pay gap across countries. Research efforts have so far been focused 
mainly on developed countries. A prominent example is the study by Lucifora and Meurs 
(2006) who explored the gap for the Great Britain, France and Italy in 1998 and found 
that institutional differences in wage regulation matter for the observed public-private 
wage gap. Other, more recent, examples include Giordano et al. (2011), Christofides and 
Michael (2013), de Castro, Salto and Steiner (2013), and Depalo, Giordano and 
Papapetrou (2013). However, most of these studies used only pre-crisis micro-data from 
European Union countries for comparison. Moreover, none of the existing studies 
considered effects of austerity measures on changes in the sectoral pay gap during the 
                                                 
1 Supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundations. 
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financial crisis for emerging economies of Eastern Europe that have recently transitioned 
from the socialist to the market system.  
 
Hence, the aim of this paper is to analyze how public and private sectors in two 
emerging market economies, Croatia and Serbia, responded to the crisis and how this 
altered the wage gap in those countries. This is important given that there was an 
increasing trend in the public-private sector pay gap before the crisis and governments in 
both countries were forced to introduce austerity measures. Particularly, Nikolic (2014) 
has shown that the premium in Serbia increased from close to zero in 2004 to 19 percent 
for men and to 12 percent for women in 2008 on average after controlling for 
observables. Similarly, the public sector pay premium after controlling for relevant 
observable characteristics in Croatia was estimated at around 9 percent in 2003 (Nestić, 
2005) as well as in 20082 (Rubil, 2013).3 There are also other reasons for our interest in 
these two particular countries. Croatia and Serbia were previously parts of the same 
country, but their paths have diverged after the breakup of the socialist system. In spite 
of similar institutional backgrounds, these two countries have chosen different paths of 
adjustment to the crisis. Whereas in Croatia the private sector undertook the major 
burden of the crisis, in Serbia the adjustments took place through wage declines in the 
public sector and both wage and employment declines in the private sector. Having the 
Labor Force Survey micro-data for Croatia and Serbia in years 2008 and 2011 allows us to 
examine the gap between wages in the public and private sector in a comparative manner 
- comparing the gaps in two countries with different institutional settings: before and 
after the start of the recent global economic crisis. 
 
This paper contributes to the standard microeconomic literature by combining the so-
called recentered influence function (RIF) regressions developed recently by Firpo, Fortin 
and Lemieux (2007; 2009) and the semi-parametric reweighting following DiNardo, 
Fortin and Lemieux (1996) for both the decompositions of the wage gaps at the mean 
and at quantiles along the distribution. The literature on the public-private wage gap 
employing these recent methods is still scarce and, to the best of our knowledge, this 
paper is the first application of this method in studying the gap between public and 
private-sector wages in (post-)transition environment. 
 
Finally, the paper provides a number of interesting results from the cross-country 
comparison perspective. First, the private sector undertook the major burden of the crisis 
in both countries. In the period observed, the crisis hit Serbia more than Croatia in 
terms of changes in both employment and wages. Second, despite the austerity measures, 
the public-private differences in the returns to characteristics for workers with similar 
characteristics increased in both countries. The public-sector premium in Serbia was 
greater than in most other EU countries, including Croatia. Third, the paper provides 
evidence that the crisis has had divergent impact on the public-private sector wage gap by 
                                                 
2 This refers to the returns to characteristics of employees in different sectors. 
3 This was also the case for many other countries (see Lausev, 2014, for a survey of public-private sector pay gap across 
developed and transitioning economies). 
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gender in these two countries. Fourth, there was an increase in the public-sector wage 
compression relative to the private-sector wage distribution. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background in 
Croatia and Serbia. The next section describes the data used in the empirical analysis, 
followed by a detailed description of the methodology applied. The following section 
reports the main empirical results and the final section concludes the paper with some 
policy implications. 
 
 
2 Labor Market Trends 
 
Although both Croatia and Serbia share similar heritage that stems from being 
constituent republics of the former Republic of Yugoslavia, after the breakup and the 
dual political and economic transition, their paths diverged. Croatia was hit by war in 
the first part of the 1990s and struggled with the transition to market economy for the 
remaining part of the decade. Serbia, on the other hand, was more-or-less trapped in the 
old system under Milošević’s ruling during the most part of the 1990s. Only in the 2000s 
both countries experienced real benefits of the market economy. However, Croatia was 
well ahead with the necessary changes, including privatization, and despite all of the 
problems, it became an EU member state in 2013 whereas Serbia became an EU 
candidate country in 2012. In this context, it should come as no surprise that the impact 
of the recent crisis, as well as economic policy response to it, were different in these two 
countries, especially in the case of the labor market. It is these differences that make the 
cross-country comparison in this paper rewarding. In the following few paragraphs, we 
briefly summarize recent economic and labor market circumstances for each of the two 
countries. 
 
Croatian economy in the period before the crisis was considered as stable investor-
friendly environment with relatively high FDI when compared to other countries in the 
region and moderate fiscal consolidation. The average growth rate of real GDP in the pre-
recession period (2000-2008) amounted to 4.3 percent, bringing about an increase in both 
employment and real wages. Due to stronger growth of GDP than wages, the productivity 
also grew, which was pronounced mainly in the private sector. Yet, the country was also 
facing low activity rates and high long-term unemployment rates coupled with regional 
disparities, systemic corruption and low capacity for reform (see Franičević, 2011).  
 
Similarly to Croatia, Serbian economy experienced strong growth in the period before 
the crisis (2001-2008). Real GDP grew annually on average by 5 percent. However, unlike 
in Croatia, the same period was characterized by significant growth of real wages above 
the real GDP, which was caused by a number of factors. One of them was the 
government’s effort to regulate wage growth consistently across certain branches of the 
public sector such as public education, public health, and public services since these 
sectors had lagged behind the national average growth during the 1990s. Other factors 
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included a new method of wage calculation, the inflow of funds from abroad in the form 
of aid, loans or privatization proceeds and fiscal expansions during the pre-election years. 
Although the largest privatizations took place during the 2001-2008 period the public 
sector in Serbia still remained the largest single employer.  
 
The financial and economic crisis in the second half of 2008 changed the growth trends 
in both countries. The cumulative fall of real GDP in Croatia in the period 2009-2011 
amounted to 9.5 percent, with a peak in 2009 of -6.9 percent. Although the economy 
recorded moderate growth of 2.1 percent in 2008, the average annual growth rate in the 
period 2008-2011 was negative, -1.8 percent (Table 1). In Serbia, year-on-year real GDP 
growth rate in 2009 was -3.5 percent, but it slowly recovered to positive until 2011 (1.6 
percent), with a positive average growth rate in the observed period (2008-2011) of 0.7 
percent. The inflation rate was rather moderate in Croatia (3 percent) and much higher 
in Serbia (9 percent) in the 2008-2011 period. 
 
Table 1  Basic Macroeconomic Indicators for Croatia and Serbia, 2008-2011 
CROATIA SERBIA 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Real GDP growth rate 2.1 -6.9 -2.3 -0.2 3.8 -3.5 1.0 1.6 
Inflation (CPI) 6.1 2.4 1.1 2.3 12.5 8.2 6.2 11.2 
Total no. of employed (000)         
   - total 1555 1499 1432 1411 1999 1889 1795 1746 
   - legal entities 1252 1211 1168 1160 1428 1396 1354 1342 
Employment rate* 57.8 56.6 54.0 52.4 53.7 50.4 47.2 45.4 
Unemployment rate* 8.6 9.3 12.1 13.9 14.4 16.9 20.0 23.6 
Wages         
Nominal         
   - gross 7544 7711 7679 7796 45674 44147 47450 52733 
   - net 5178 5311 5343 5441 32746 31733 34142 37976 
Real (chain indices)         
   - gross 100.9 99.8 98.5 99.2 n/a 104.1 98.8 102.3 
   - net 100.8 100.2 99.5 99.6 n/a 103.8 98.9 102.2 
 
Note: * - based on ILO methodology for the age group 15-64. 
Sources: Eurostat, Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. 
 
 
The crisis also had a large impact on the labor market in both countries. As shown in 
Table 1 the employment fell by a substantial amount, while the unemployment rates 
increased in both countries. For example, in the period 2008–2011, the average number 
of employed decreased by more than 140 thousand (almost 10 percent) in Croatia, while 
the survey-based unemployment rate grew from 8.6 percent to 13.9 percent in the same 
period, and further to 16.3 percent in 2012. Serbia was even more hit by the crisis. In 
particular, in 2011 there were more than 250 thousand less employed workers than in 
2008. However, number of employed in legal entities in Serbia dropped by around 85 
thousand while the most significant decline came from entrepreneurships. The 
unemployment rate increased from 14.4 percent in 2008 to 23.6 percent in 2011. 
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Similarly, in Croatia the distribution of employment cuts was also not even across sectors 
as layoffs were mostly present in the private sector. In contrast, the number of employed 
in public services (public administration, education, health) increased slightly during the 
same period. This observation points to high employment protection in the public sector 
as opposed to the private sector, or, as some would argue (Franičević, 2011), to a “dual” 
character of the labor market with protected workers from the state sector on one side 
and workers employed in the private sector without collective agreements, those on 
temporary contracts, the young and the old on the other side. 
 
The official statistics shows that in Croatia both gross and net nominal wages continued 
to grow slightly during the crisis (except in 2010 in the case of gross wages), while in 
Serbia the decrease in nominal wages has been recorded already in 2009. This suggests the 
presence of downward nominal wage rigidity in Croatian labor market, which should 
come as no surprise given that maintaining wages was much more important for trade 
unions than the employment level ever since the beginning of transition (Tomić and 
Domadenik, 2012). Also, the burden of adjustment in the crisis was much more on the 
employment than on the wage side in both countries. In Serbia, nominal wages started to 
increase already in 2010, however; due to a rather strong increase in prices, real wages fell 
in Serbia in 2010 with an increase back in 2011. 
 
The crisis also caused increased budget deficits which had to be financed either by 
increasing revenues or by cutting expenditures. Serbian government introduced a series of 
expenditure cuts, one of which was a nominal wage freeze in the public sector for a 
period of two years. The freeze was maintained until April 2011 when public sector wages 
were adjusted for inflation plus one-half of GDP growth over the following twelve 
months. The public sector pay bill has been further reduced by freeze in recruitment. It 
was expected that the 2009-2010 freeze4 would decrease real wages in the public sector 
significantly below the 2008-level, while indexation based on the rate of inflation in the 
following years would maintain the purchasing power of public sector workers without 
increases in the public sector real wage bill (World Bank, 2010). Indeed, the public sector 
pay bill declined over 2009–2011, by 0.3 percent of GDP. However, this decline was 
smaller than in most other emerging and advanced European economies (IMF, 2013). 
Given that public sector employment levels remained roughly constant, most of this 
decline was due to decreases in real wages. In particular, public sector real wages in public 
administration, education and health fell by 4.9 percent, 3.7 percent and 3.0 percent, 
respectively in 2009 (World Bank, 2010); and more than 7 percent from September 2009 
until September 2010 in total. In contrast to public sector, private sector employment 
                                                 
4 The World Bank (2010) points to negligible short-term impact and no long-term impact of some additional measures, 
introduced by the Serbian Government, such as the decision to temporarily cut average wages in administration, by 10 
percent, from January until December 2009. This affected the wages of elected officials and managerial and 
administrative staff, civil servants and both state and local level public service employees. However, military personnel, 
police, prison guards, and employees in education, health, culture, and social protection were exempted. 
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declined in the same period. The average private sector wage also declined in 2011 
compared to 2008, but less than in the public sector.5  
 
The Croatian government mainly opted to increase the revenue side by further 
borrowing, but it also increased the VAT and introduced the so-called “crisis tax” levied 
on the net income of households. However, the expenditure side of the government 
budget was left more-or-less intact. One of the biggest expenditure items - the 
compensation of employees, which includes both wages and social security contributions 
- actually increased its share in total government expenditures from 25.8 percent in 2008 
to 26.8 percent in 2011. Nevertheless, there have been some attempts to reduce or at least 
to stop the rise in both public sector employment and wages as of the start of the crisis. 
For example, all new hiring in public administration was frozen already in 2009, 
followed by a “one for two” (two in, one out) system in 2010; public sector wage cuts 
occurred already in 2009 when 10 percent wage cuts for state officials and 5 percent cuts 
for managers in public companies were introduced; the base wage in the public sector was 
cut by 6 percent and temporarily frozen also in 2009, although this happened only few 
months after the increase of wages by the same amount.6 However, due to strong 
bargaining power of public sector trade unions and agreements set for some particular 
groups of workers before the crisis, wages continued to grow in the public sector during 
the whole observed period. Combining this with a frozen minimum wage, mainly present 
in the private sector (see Nestić, 2010), and a moderate inflation there was a stronger 
growth of wages in the public sector as compared to the private sector which had to 
undertake stronger adjustments in both employment and wages.7 
 
 
3 Data 
 
The empirical analysis is based on nationally representative cross-sectional data from the 
Labor Force Survey (LFS) for both Croatia and Serbia for the years 2008 and 2011. The 
year 2008 represents the pre-crisis period and the year 2011 represents a period in which 
effects of the crisis could be summarized.8 In Croatia, the data for both 2008 and 2011 
were collected on a quarterly basis as a rotating panel, following the so-called “2-(2)-2” 
survey design9 whereas in Serbia the data are collected semi-annually.10 The working 
                                                 
5 Smaller decline in average private sector wage potentially resulted from two factors. Firstly, minimum wage increased 
in January 2009 and the majority of minimum wage earners were in the private sector. Secondly, Arandarenko and 
Avlijaš (2011) point that the job losses in the private sector were more pronounced for workers on less secured lower 
wage contracts due to lower hiring and firing costs. 
6 In 2012, additional restrictions on overtime, temporary service contracts and fixed-time contracts were introduced. 
Non-wage compensations, such as Christmas and holiday bonuses, were cut in 2010, and completely abolished in 2012 
and 2013, together with some restrictions on travel allowances, while in March 2013 gross wages in the entire public 
sector were further reduced by 3 percent. 
7 For detailed overview of the crisis adjustments in the public sector in the period 2009-2012, as well as for the role of 
trade unions and collective agreements, please refer to Franičević and Matković (2013). 
8 Additionally, the latest available LFS data for Serbia are from 2011. 
9 Precisely, each sampled household is interviewed for two consecutive quarters, then it is left out for the next two 
consecutive quarters, and then it is interviewed again for two consecutive quarters. Therefore, in a given year, the 
observations from the first and third quarters do not overlap, and the same holds for the observations from the second 
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samples are restricted to full-time employees between 15 and 64 years old who reported 
non-zero monthly wages and non-zero hours of work11 for their main job only. Applying 
these restrictions, we are left with 5,863 observations in 2008 and 3,926 observations in 
2011 sample in the case of Croatia and with 4,416 and 4,465 observations in 2008 and 
2011 samples, respectively for Serbia (Table 2).  
 
We make a distinction between two main sectors: public and private. The public sector is 
set to include all ownership types other than private.12 This means that the public sector 
includes public sector education, health and administration as well as state and socially 
owned enterprises. According to this classification, public sector workers comprised 
about 42 percent of the restricted sample in Croatia in both 2008 and 2011,13 while in 
Serbia these figures were somewhat higher - about 46 percent for both 2008 and 2011. 
The earnings measure relates to pay net of taxes, pensions and any payments by the 
worker into welfare plans divided by the consumer price index. The wage variable used in 
the empirical analysis is defined as the real net hourly wage computed from monthly 
wages reported in the survey divided by usual monthly hours of work.14 It is important to 
note that the Serbian Labor Force Survey does not provide continuous wage variable in 
2011. Particularly, in this survey the individuals are allocated into fourteen wage ranges. 
Following the approach used in the literature on public-private sector wage differentials 
(see, for example, Christopoulou and Monasteriotis, 2013) we created a pseudo-
continuous wage variable as the mean value of the wage income bands per observation. 
We acknowledge that this data limitation may affect the results of the analysis and hence, 
apply several robustness tests to show that the results are not materially altered.  
 
Explanatory variables are divided into two main groups: personal characteristics and job 
characteristics, as is usual in the literature (see, for instance, Christopoulou and 
Monasteriotis, 2013). The set of explanatory personal characteristics consists of: gender, 
age and age squared, marital status, urban vs. rural place of residence, four indicators for 
                                                                                                                                               
and fourth quarters. To ensure that our samples do not contain overlapping observations, for each of the two years, we 
removed all observations that were being repeated from the previous quarter. 
10 In April and October each year and we use data sets from April 2008 and April 2011. 
11 Actually, we limit ourselves only to those that worked above 30 hours per week and bellow 80 hours a week. Usually, 
full-time employment is considered to be 40 hours per week. However, there is an assumption that an individual can be 
employed full-time but still work less than 40 hour per week (see, for instance, Christofides and Michael, 2013). 
12 The same distinction between sectors is used in other studies that measured public-private sector pay differentials in 
Croatia and Serbia (e.g. Bejaković, Bratić and Vukšić, 2011; Nikolic, 2014; Jovanović and Lokshin, 2003; and Reilly, 
2003). Although public sector defined in this way can be perceived as overly heterogeneous, for the sake of comparison 
we decided to keep this wider definition that is used in most of the other studies. Also, one may argue that due to 
privatization the structure of the public sector employment may have changed during the observed period, however; 
the privatization has been significantly slowed during the crisis and, hence, should not have significant impact on our 
results. 
13 Administrative data from the CBS indicate that state ownership combined with mixed ownership (“public sector”) 
employment comprised of 44.1 percent in both 2008 and 2011. According to those data (situation on 31 March) both 
the employment in the public sector as well as in the private sector decreased by about seven percent between 2008 and 
2011. 
14 Since the survey reference period was a week prior to the interview we multiply the reported usual weekly hours by 
the average number of weeks in a month (i.e., 4.25) and assume that the number of hours worked was uniform in the 
month prior to the interview. 
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the educational level (low, medium, high, and master's and doctor's degrees), experience 
and experience squared, tenure and tenure squared. Job characteristics comprise the 
following set of variables: nine occupational groups,15 whether the person has temporary 
or permanent contract, whether the person is supervising other employees at their main 
job, the size of the establishment/firm (small, medium, large),16 the economic activity of 
the establishment,17 and the regional location18 of the establishment.19 Summary statistics 
of these variables by each sector is given in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix, for 
Croatia and Serbia, respectively. 
 
First, we observe that there are significant differences in the means of characteristics 
between the public and private sectors in each of the two years and in both countries. In 
both years, the genders are virtually equally represented in the public sector, whereas in 
the private sector there are notably fewer females, whose share is about 43 percent in 
Croatia and 42 percent in Serbia. Additionally, workers in the public sector are on 
average about 6 years older in Croatia and about 5 years in Serbia. Public sector workers 
are also on average better educated. For example, while the share of highly skilled workers 
(college and university graduates) in the public sector is about one third, the 
corresponding share is 15 percent or less in the case of the private sector.  
 
Both the private and the public sector workers mostly work in small establishments, up 
to 50 employees, with this characteristic being more pronounced in the case of the 
private sector. However, this information should be taken with caution since the 
reporting about the size of the establishment depends on the interviewee’s perception of 
the definition of the establishment and its number of employees. As far as occupational 
structure is concerned, most of the public sector employees are professionals, technicians, 
or clerks, whereas in the private sector most are craftsmen, plant/machine operators, or 
deal with services and sales. More workers in the private sector are employed on a 
temporary contract, 13 to 14 percent in comparison to only 5-6 percent in the public 
sector in Croatia, while in Serbia this share is about 10 and 12 percent for the private 
sector and 5 and 7 percent for the public sector in 2008 and 2011, respectively. Public 
sector workers are correspondingly slightly more represented on supervising positions. 
                                                 
15 Based on ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations). It is important to mention that there are 
some differences in the definition of these broad occupational groups in 2008 and 2011. In 2008, the definition used 
was based on ISCO-88 (COM) classification, while the survey from 2011 was based on ISCO-08 classification. For 
details, please see: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco08/. 
16 These groups are defined according to the number of employees: <50 for small firms; 50-200 (250 for Serbia) for 
medium firms and >200 (>250 for Serbia) for large firms. 
17 Based on NACE (Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community) classification. In 2008, 
NACE Rev 1.1 was applied, while in 2011 NACE Rev 2.1 classification was applied. For details, please refer to: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Statistical_classification_of_economic_activiti
es_in_the_European_Community_(NACE). 
18 According to NUTS2 statistical classification before the change in 2012 in the case of Croatia. Also, no indication of 
the location of the establishment was available in Serbian LFS, so we assumed that the location of the worker is the 
same as the location of the firm. 
19 Unfortunately, none of the variables related to household (number of children, relationship between household’s 
members, etc.) could have been used since the data available do not provide the identification of the interviewed 
household. 
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Table 2  Summary of Wages and Working Hours by Countries and Sectors 
2008 2011 
Public Private Public Private Wages/hours worked 
CROATIA 
Usual hours per week 40.66 41.82 40.58 41.26 
Nominal monthly wage 4616.16 3939.40 5082.04 4142.63 
Real monthly wage (HRK) 4773.69 4073.83 4967.78 4049.49 
Log real hourly wage 3.26 3.04 3.30 3.05 
Gini index (rhw) 0.184 0.247 0.187 0.244 
No. of observations 2194 3099 1640 2286 
 SERBIA 
Usual hours per week 41.00 44.17 40.95 43.80 
Nominal monthly wage 30222.60 23312.04 33878.39 26356.14 
Real monthly wage (RSD) 34648.28 26725.77 29513.36 22960.31 
Log real hourly wage 5.16 4.79 5.02 4.69 
Gini index (rhw) 0.275 0.324 0.254 0.276 
No. of observations 2015 2401 2027 2438 
 
Source: Croatian and Serbian LFS, 2008 and 2011. 
 
 
In our empirical analysis we use only several economic sectors, namely, those that are 
perceived to be “the most important” for the overall economy. As we can observe from 
tables A1 and A2, these are mainly “private” sectors, with more than 70 percent in the 
case of Croatia and more than 80 percent in the case of Serbia of the private sector 
employment contained in these sectors - manufacturing, construction, wholesale and 
retail trade, transport and communication and financial intermediation. This is the case 
for only about 25 percent of employees in the public sector. Also, employees in both 
sectors are mostly located in the Northwest region (including Zagreb, the capital) in 
Croatia, while in Serbia this is the case with Šumadija and West Serbia region. Finally, 
with the exception of characteristics measured in years (age, experience, and tenure), the 
differences in means over the period considered are quite small for both sectors in both 
countries. This should not come as a surprise, given that the time span is only four years 
long, and one can hardly expect any sizeable changes in the distribution of individual 
characteristics. 
 
The most important part of our analysis - wages, together with hours of work - deserves 
special attention (Table 2).20 At first one can observe a higher number of working hours 
in the private sector, especially in Serbia. The average number of weekly working hours 
insignificantly decreased in the observed period in both sectors and both countries. As 
for the wages, they are evidently lower in the private sector. In both countries, nominal 
wages grew in both sectors in the observed period. In Croatia, real wages grew only in the 
public sector, but on a much lesser scale due to moderate inflation (Table 1) which 
suggests that there was no real impact of the introduced measures on wages in the public 
sector. In contrast to nominal wages, real wages in Serbia decreased in both sectors, but 
                                                 
20 More detailed information is available in the Appendix. 
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more so in the public sector confirming some effects from austerity measures. Inequality 
measures (Gini index) suggest that the inequality of real hourly wages is higher in the 
private sector in both countries and in both years. However, the inequality decreased in 
both sectors in Serbia in the observed period, while in Croatia it decreased only slightly 
in the private sector and increased in the public sector. 
 
 
4 Methodology 
 
In this section we describe the empirical method used for decompositions of wage gaps at 
the mean and at quantiles along the distribution. We rely on an extension to the 
standard Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973), proposed 
recently by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007; 2011). This extension, based on a 
combination of the so-called Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regressions of Firpo, 
Fortin and Lemieux (2007; 2009) and the semi-parametric reweighting of DiNardo, 
Fortin and Lemieux (1996) allows one to employ the OB-type decompositions for any 
distributional statistic that has its influence function, including the mean and any 
quantile along the distribution. 
 
Let ( )yF  denote either the mean, ( ) ( )y yF F  , or a  - quantile, ( ) ( )y yF Q F  , 
of a distribution of wages, y , with the cumulative distribution function yF . The 
influence function of ( )yF , ( ; ; )IF y F , is defined as the effect of a small 
perturbation in the distribution on the value of the distributional statistic,  . For the 
mean, the influence function is ( ; ; ) ( )yIF y F y F   , while for a  -quantile the IF 
has been shown to be  ( ; ; ) ( ) / ( ( ))y y yIF Q y F I y Q F f Q F        , where  .I  
is an indicator function equal to 1 if the condition in brackets holds and zero otherwise, 
and ( ( ))y yf Q F  is the density of wages at ( )yQ F . The recentered influence function 
(RIF) is defined as the sum of the distributional statistic of interest and its IF, so that the 
RIFs of the mean and a quantile are given as ( ; ; )RIF y F y   and  ( ; ; ) ( ) ( ) / ( ( ))y y y yRIF Q y F Q F I y Q F f Q F          , respectively. Further, 
since the expected value of the IF of any distributional statistic is by definition equal to 
zero, the expectation of the corresponding RIF is equal to the distributional statistic 
itself:  ( ; ; ) ( )yE RIF y F F  ,  ( ; ; ) ( )yE RIF Q y F Q F  . 
 
Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007; 2009) assume that the RIF can be approximated by the 
linear function ( ; ; )RIF y F X     which by the Law of Iterated Expectations and 
the assumption that  | 0E X   imply    ( ; ; )E RIF y F E X  . Thus, the OLS 
regression of ( ; ; )RIF y F  on X , called RIF-regression, will give parameter estimates 
with both the conditional and unconditional interpretations. This property is a 
consequence of using the RIF of a distributional statistic, instead of the outcome variable 
(wage in our case) itself, as the dependent variable. Obviously, a RIF-regression for the 
mean is equivalent to the standard OLS regression. However, RIF-regressions for 
quantiles are not equivalent to the standard quantile regressions of Koenker and Basset 
(1978). The difference is that while the standard quantile regressions model conditional 
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quantiles, the RIF-regressions for quantiles model unconditional quantiles (quantiles of 
the marginal distribution), which is why Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) call them 
Unconditional Quantile Regressions. For that reason, the parameters from the two types 
of quantile regressions do not have the same interpretation: while the standard quantile 
regression parameters have only conditional interpretation, those from RIF-regressions 
for quantiles, just like OLS parameters, have both conditional and unconditional 
interpretations.21 
 
Denoting the public (private) sector by the label PUB (PRI), the overall or raw wage gap, 
 – be it at the mean (  ) or at a  -quantile of interest ( Q  ) – can be 
expressed as: 
     ˆ ˆ( ; ; ) ( ; ; )PUB PRI PUB PUB PRI PRIE RIF y F E RIF y F X X          ,   (1) 
 
where X  and ˆ  are, respectively, the vector of average characteristics and the vector of 
RIF-regression parameter estimates for the corresponding sector. If one followed the 
standard OB decomposition method, one would add and subtract the counterfactual 
wage ˆPUB PRIX   (or ˆPRI PUBX  ) to obtain two parts of the overall gap: (i) composition 
effect which reflects sectoral differences in characteristics, ˆ( )PUB PRI PRIX X  , and (ii) 
wage structure effect which reflects the effect of sectoral differences in marginal rewards 
to those characteristics, ˆ ˆ( )PUB PUB PRIX   . However, Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007; 
2011) argue that when the true conditional RIF is not linear as assumed, a standard OB 
decomposition of the wage gap, which is based on linear approximations of the true 
conditional expectation functions, generally yields biased estimates of the wage structure 
and composition effects. The underlying idea, discussed first in the context of mean 
decomposition by Barsky et al. (2002), is that when the parameters of a linear conditional 
expectation functions for two groups (in our case the public and private sectors) are not 
estimated over the common support of the distribution of characteristics, the wage 
structure effect from the standard OB decomposition does not identify the wage 
structure effect. This stems from the fact that in the case of a nonlinear conditional 
expectation function the marginal rewards to the characteristics (i.e., the corresponding 
OLS coefficients) generally depend on the support of the distribution of those 
characteristics.  
 
With this issue in mind, Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007) proposed a hybrid approach 
which combines reweighting a la DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) with RIF-
regressions. The underlying idea is to first make the distributions of characteristics in the 
two sectors similar to one another. This is done by reweighting the sample of one sector 
(private in our case), using inverse probability weighting based on a parametrically 
estimated reweighting factor, in such a way that its distribution of characteristics 
resembles, as closely as possible, the one of the other sector. Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux 
(2007) replace the counterfactual mean wage ˆPUB PRIX   by ˆREW REWX  , where REW 
                                                 
21 See Fournier and Koske (2013) and Borah and Basu (2013) for illustrations of differences in interpretation of 
conditional and unconditional quantile regressions. 
 18 
denotes the sample of private sector workers reweighted to resemble public sector workers 
in terms of the distribution of observable characteristics. Thus, REWX  and ˆREW  stand 
for, respectively, the average characteristics in the reweighted private sector sample and 
the OLS coefficients estimated on this sample. The decomposition reads: 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )PUB PUB REW REW REW REW PRI PRI WS CX X X X
               ,   (2) 
 
where the two terms on the right-hand side represent the wage structure (labelled WS) and 
composition (labelled C) effects, respectively. 
 
Each of the two terms in (2) can be decomposed further into the true effect accounted 
for by the linear specification and an error: 
 
, ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )WS PUB PUB REW PUB REW REW WS TRUE WS ERRORX X X
              ,  (3) 
 
, ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )C REW PRI PRI REW REW PRI C TRUE C ERRORX X X
              . (4) 
 
In both (3) and (4) the first right-hand side terms are the true wage structure and 
composition effects ( ,WS TRUE
  and ,C TRUE , respectively), while the last terms are errors. 
The error term in (3) is a reweighting error ( ,WS ERROR
 ), which should vanish in large 
samples if the reweighting factor is estimated consistently, while the one in (4) is a 
misspecification error ( ,C ERROR
 ) stemming from imposing linearity on the conditional 
expected wage function when it is non-linear. 
 
This approach entails two identifying assumptions. First is known as ignorability22 (of 
the unobservables, i.e., of the error term in the wage equations). By this assumption, the 
conditional distribution of unobservables, given observables, is the same across the two 
sectors. It ensures that neither the wage structure nor the composition effect is 
confounded by differences in the conditional distributions of unobservables between the 
two sectors. Second assumption is that the distribution of the observables for the two 
sectors overlap or, in other words, that there is common support. This assumption rules 
out any observable characteristic, which completely identifies an individual as a member 
of either sector. The main shortcoming of the method is that it provides only local linear 
approximations to the effects of (possibly large) actual changes in workers’ characteristics 
and their marginal returns.  
 
Each of the two true effects can be further decomposed into the contributions of each of 
the explanatory characteristics or groups of characteristics. It should be stressed here that 
such detailed decompositions suffer from certain identification issues when, as is the case 
with our and virtually all other empirical exercises, the set of characteristics contains 
some categorical characteristics such as gender or occupation. As noted by a number of 
authors (Jones, 1983; Jones and Kelley, 1984; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999; Horrace and 
                                                 
22 Also known as selection on observables or unconfoundedness. 
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Oaxaca, 2001), the contributions of categorical characteristics generally depend on the 
choice of category to be omitted from the wage regressions.23 Although a general solution 
to these issues has not yet appeared, Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2004) and Yun (2005) have 
proposed an elegant, though to an extent arbitrary “solution”, which we employ in the 
present paper as well. In a nutshell, they proposed a solution which, as shown by Yun 
(2005), gives results which would be obtained if one were to perform decompositions for 
all possible choices of the omitted category and averaged the results across all these 
decompositions.  
 
 
5 Results 
 
5.1 Overview of Goals 
 
The empirical analysis has five goals. First, we want to test whether there was a public-
private sector earnings differential in Croatia and Serbia and how it changed from 2008 
to 2011. For this purpose, we initially pool both sectors’ data together in an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) model. In this way we obtain an estimate of the public sector pay gap 
at the unconditional and conditional mean. The unconditional (or the so called “total”) 
public sector pay gap estimates are raw differences in mean log real hourly wages between 
public and private sectors. The conditional public sector pay gap estimates are the 
differences in the mean log real hourly wages between the public and private sectors after 
controlling for labor market characteristics of the workers. Nevertheless, the differences 
in rates of payment between public and private sector estimated in this way are limited to 
an intercept shift, whereas the returns to characteristics are constrained to be equal across 
sectors. In order to reveal whether the returns to characteristics differ across sectors we 
estimate OLS regressions for each sector separately at the conditional mean. 
 
Our second goal is to obtain estimates of the public-private pay differential by allowing 
for different intercepts and returns to characteristics across sectors. For this reason we 
apply an OB-type of decomposition to decompose the total (or unconditional) pay 
differential into a component that is due to differences in the mean values of 
characteristics (the so-called “composition effect” or “explained” part) and a component 
that is due to differences in the coefficients, i.e., the returns to characteristics (the so-
called “wage structure effect” or “unexplained” part). The wage structure effect could be 
interpreted as conditional public sector pay premium or penalty. 
 
Our third goal is to apply the method of detailed decompositions in order to analyze 
composition and wage structure effects of the total sectoral pay differential broken down 
to groups of covariates. Initially, we have been interested in observing the individual 
contribution of a particular set of average job and personal characteristics to total pay 
gap assuming equal returns across sectors to the same characteristics. Subsequently, we 
                                                 
23 For a discussion and illustrative examples of these identification issues, see Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011). 
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have wanted to know what would be the difference in returns to a particular set of 
characteristics between the two sectors if public sector workers had the same 
characteristics as private sector workers. The fourth goal has been to apply the same 
method but for men and women separately given that the gap usually varies with gender. 
Finally, our fifth goal has been to test whether the public sector pay effect for workers 
with similar characteristics varies across the earnings distribution. For this purpose we 
have decomposed wage gaps at selected percentiles based on unconditional quantile 
regressions.  
 
 
5.2 Public-Private Sector Pay Gap at the Mean 
 
Public-private sector earnings differentials may be largely determined by different worker 
and job characteristics. In order to obtain average public-private sector pay differentials 
conditional on observed characteristics for each year, for Croatia and Serbia separately, 
we first pool both sectors’ data together and run an OLS wage regression with a public 
sector dummy. These results are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix and show that 
there is a public sector premium. In both countries the public sector premium was higher 
in 2011 than in 2008. While the size of the premium in Croatia was in the range of most 
other EU countries or even lower, i.e., around 5.5 percent (see de Castro, Salto and 
Steiner, 2013 for other EU countries which shows that the average premium in the EU 
was around 4 percent), the premium in Serbia was around three times higher. 
Furthermore, same regressions show lower returns to higher educational qualifications in 
Croatia than in Serbia. In addition, there was a decline in returns to education in 2011 
relative to 2008 in Croatia for all educational groups. Similar results are confirmed for 
Serbia, with the exception of returns to the highest educational level which increased 
during the observed period. Table A3 in the Appendix also shows that female workers 
were paid less than male workers in both countries. Male-female pay gap was similar 
across countries before the crisis. In 2011, this gap remained more-or-less the same in 
Croatia, but declined in Serbia indicating that men were more affected by the crisis than 
women. Furthermore, we find that the labor force age, experience and tenure effects were 
poorly determined in the regression specifications for both countries. In our further 
analysis we obtain OLS regression results for public and private sectors separately using 
the same set of covariates (presented in Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix). These results 
indicate differences in the returns to both personal and job characteristics between the 
two sectors.  
 
For that reason we proceed with the mean decompositions. The results are presented in 
Table 3. We first note that, for both countries and for both years, the sum of the true 
composition and wage structure effects differs very little from the total gap; in other 
words, the total error is small relative to the total gap.24 This shows that the wage 
                                                 
24 Generally, about half of the total error is due to misspecification of the wage equation (the linearity assumption), 
while the other half is due to imperfect reweighting. The exception is Serbia in 2008, where virtually the whole error is 
due to misspecification. 
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equations are not misspecified as linear and that the reweighting balances characteristics 
between the sectors quite well. Starting from the mean wage by sector, Table 3 shows that 
the public sector in Croatia experienced a larger rise (4 percent) than the private sector (1 
percent) during the observed period. This is consistent with the common perception in 
Croatia that the private sector was hit by the recession more severely than the public 
sector. In Serbia, conversely, both public and private sector average wages fell during the 
observed period. However, the fall in the public sector was greater than in the private 
sector (13 percent vs. 9 percent). 
 
 
Table 3  Mean Decompositions of the Public-Private Wage Gap 
CROATIA SERBIA 
2008 2011 2008 2011  
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Aggregate decomposition 
Mean wage: public 3.263 0.007 3.303 0.008 5.157 0.012 5.020 0.012 
Mean wage: private 3.036 0.008 3.046 0.009 4.792 0.012 4.694 0.011 
True composition effect 0.190 0.015 0.218 0.017 0.246 0.026 0.138 0.024 
True wage structure effect 0.044 0.008 0.055 0.008 0.145 0.015 0.179 0.014 
Misspecification error -0.003 0.015 -0.007 0.016 -0.027 0.027 0.004 0.026 
Reweighting error -0.004 0.008 -0.011 0.009 0.002 0.011 0.005 0.010 
True comp. and w. str. effects 0.234 0.273 0.391 0.317 
Total error -0.007 -0.017 -0.025 0.008 
Total gap 0.227 0.256 0.366 0.325 
Detailed decomposition 
True composition effect                 
Gender 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.011 0.003 
Education 0.028 0.004 0.014 0.004 0.051 0.007 0.037 0.006 
Experience 0.031 0.011 0.021 0.010 0.025 0.012 0.039 0.012 
Occupation 0.084 0.006 0.088 0.008 0.092 0.011 0.044 0.010 
Other 0.046 0.018 0.097 0.019 0.076 0.027 0.030 0.026 
True wage structure effect               
Gender 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.001 
Education 0.098 0.019 -0.054 0.013 0.063 0.045 0.058 0.034 
Experience -0.059 0.065 0.107 0.068 -0.264 0.087 -0.112 0.082 
Occupation -0.019 0.009 -0.012 0.009 -0.058 0.023 -0.023 0.020 
Other 0.019 0.068 0.014 0.071 0.406 0.104 0.258 0.092 
 
Notes: Decompositions are based on Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux’s (2007) approach (see equations 2 to 4). Yun’s (2005) 
procedure is used to ensure invariance of the results to the choice of the omitted category for categorical characteristics. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Croatian and Serbian LFS, 2008 and 2011. 
 
 
The OB decompositions determine the contribution of the “explained” differential due 
to sectoral differences in characteristics (i.e., composition effect) to be around 85 percent 
in Croatia in both years, while the rest is the contribution of the “unexplained” 
differential due to sectoral differences in marginal returns to the same characteristics (i.e., 
wage structure effect). In contrast, in Serbia differences in characteristics explain around 
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70 percent of the total gap in 2008 and only about 40 percent in 2011. This means that 
the wage structure effect in 2011 accounted for more than half of the total differential in 
Serbia. Therefore, in 2011, in terms of personal and labor market characteristics, public 
and private sector workers became more similar, but disparities in terms of marginal 
returns to those characteristics increased. In spite of public sector austerity measures, the 
results from Table 3 suggest that the private sector in Serbia was hit more by the financial 
crisis. This is indicated by greater changes in employment structure and lower payments 
for the same characteristics than in the public sector. Comparing the year 2011 with 2008 
for Croatia, results show greater increase in the composition effect than increase in the 
wage structure effect which is slightly unexpected since in such a short period, one can 
hardly expect the distribution of characteristics to change significantly. However, 
evidently the changes that happened in the employment structure, especially in the 
private sector, during the crisis further increased the differences in both personal and job 
characteristics between the two sectors.25 
 
In particular, once we remove the “explained” part of the differential or composition 
effect, what remains is the “unexplained” part of the differential or wage structure effect. 
This reveals a public sector pay premium in both 2008 and 2011 for both countries. The 
public sector wage premium was around 4.4 percent26 in 2008 and 5.5 percent in 2011 in 
Croatia and around 14.5 percent in 2008 and 17.9 percent in 2011 in Serbia. These 
results suggest what the pay gap would be if public sector workers had the same labor 
market characteristics as private sector workers. The estimated premiums are consistent 
with our previous OLS results confirming that Croatia had a public pay gap in line with 
most EU countries whereas Serbia significantly exceeded these differentials. 
 
Moreover, detailed decomposition allows us to observe why the total (i.e., unconditional) 
gap is greater than the true gap reweighted by job and personal characteristics (usually 
referred to as conditional pay gap). Table 3 shows that the pay gap in both countries in 
2008 was overestimated mostly due to differences in occupations. In particular, Table 3 
displays that public sector workers are on average employed in higher-paid occupations 
than private sector workers. The differences in occupations between public and private 
sectors accounted for 44 percent and 37 percent of the composition effect in 2008 in 
Croatia and Serbia, respectively. Moreover, public sector workers also have a higher level 
of education and more experience than private sector workers. Differences in educational 
qualifications and experience accounted for around 31 percent of the composition effect 
in 2008 in both countries. Gender differences in the distribution of public and private 
sectors had a negligible effect on the pay gap. Yet, differences in other characteristics 
made the public-private sector pay gap seem higher. In Croatia, these differences became 
even more important than differences in occupations in 2011, whereas in Serbia their 
contribution to the composition effect declined and occupational differences remained 
the most important single factor. On the other hand, differences in educational 
                                                 
25 This can also be observed from the summary statistics (Table A1 in the Appendix). 
26 For ease of exposition, throughout the text we interpret logarithmic differences as percentages: x log points = x*100 
percent. 
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qualifications and experience accounted for 55 percent of the composition effect in 
Serbia in 2011 while in Croatia these differences declined to 16 percent of the 
composition effect of the public-private sector pay gap. 
 
In our further analysis we focus on the wage structure effect. In both countries in 2008 
the public sector paid more for the same level of education, but less for the same 
experience and occupation than the private sector. While in Serbia these differences 
narrowed but remained in 2011, sectoral differences in returns to these labor market 
characteristics changed during the financial crisis in Croatia. Particularly, in 2011, the 
private sector offered greater returns for educational qualifications than the public sector 
while the public sector valued experience more than the private sector. As explained in 
Section 2, experience is valued more in the public sector, especially after the start of the 
crisis when wages in the public sector increased automatically every year based on the 
years of service due to previously agreed collective agreements with trade unions. In the 
private sector, market forces are more present, which means that experience is not 
important as are the skills, i.e., education, when trying to rationalize business in the time 
of crisis. Additionally, in both countries returns to occupational qualifications were 
greater in the private than in the public sector in both 2008 and 2011. Finally, differences 
in the returns to gender and other characteristics were rather small, with the public sector 
being more generous, in both years in Croatia. In Serbia, differences in returns to gender 
were small, but differences to other characteristics were the major contributor to the wage 
structure effect in both years. 
 
 
5.3 Public-Private Sector Pay Gap at the Mean by Gender 
 
In this section we disaggregate data by gender in order to reveal further effects of the 
crisis on the public-private wage gap. Splitting the whole sample by gender in Table 4, 
results for Croatia show that although the total (i.e., unconditional) pay differential is 
higher for women than for men, this is mostly due to differences in characteristics. In 
Croatia, women differ more than men between the two sectors in all characteristics. 
However, when the composition effect of the differential is removed, the results disclose 
a greater sectoral difference in returns to the same characteristics for men than for 
women in both years. In Croatia, between 2008 and 2011, the public sector wage 
premium for an average male worker increased from 6 to 7 percent and for an average 
female worker from zero to around 4 percent. On the other hand, male workers in Serbia 
had twice a higher premium than in Croatia, i.e., around 14 percent in both years. The 
composition effect for this group of workers also remained almost unchanged during the 
observed period contributing to 60 percent of the total pay gap. The difference in public 
sector pay premium between Croatia and Serbia was even greater for female workers. 
Particularly, women employed in the Serbian public sector received a 10 percent 
premium in 2008 which increased to 22 percent in 2011. 
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Table 4  Mean Decompositions of the Public-Private Wage Gap by Gender 
2008 2011 
Male Female Male Female 
 Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
CROATIA 
Aggregate decomposition 
True composition effect 0.137 0.018 0.269 0.024 0.123 0.020 0.339 0.030 
True wage structure effect 0.061 0.012 0.001 0.010 0.070 0.012 0.043 0.012 
Misspecification error -0.003 0.018 -0.019 0.021 0.016 0.020 -0.028 0.027 
Reweighting error -0.003 0.010 0.036 0.012 0.001 0.011 -0.022 0.016 
True comp. and w. str. effects 0.198 0.270 0.193 0.382 
Total error -0.007 0.016 0.018 -0.050 
Total gap 0.191 0.286 0.210 0.332 
Detailed decomposition 
True composition effect         
Education 0.026 0.004 0.035 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.020 0.009 
Experience 0.023 0.018 0.015 0.012 -0.003 0.017 0.021 0.012 
Occupation 0.057 0.007 0.163 0.014 0.035 0.008 0.166 0.021 
Other 0.031 0.025 0.056 0.024 0.084 0.026 0.132 0.028 
True wage structure effect         
Education 0.028 0.027 0.143 0.019 -0.110 0.026 -0.036 0.012 
Experience -0.185 0.111 0.100 0.072 0.170 0.116 0.301 0.081 
Occupation -0.008 0.010 -0.052 0.022 -0.008 0.010 -0.011 0.050 
Other 0.226 0.114 -0.190 0.076 0.018 0.119 -0.211 0.098 
SERBIA 
Aggregate decomposition 
True composition effect 0.201 0.031 0.344 0.042 0.197 0.027 0.056 0.045 
True wage structure effect 0.144 0.019 0.100 0.022 0.139 0.019 0.220 0.021 
Misspecification error -0.010 0.033 -0.062 0.041 -0.022 0.030 0.058 0.047 
Reweighting error -0.020 0.014 0.059 0.018 0.000 0.014 0.015 0.016 
True comp. and w. str. effects 0.345 0.444 0.336 0.276 
Total error -0.030 -0.003 -0.022 0.073 
Total gap 0.315 0.441 0.314 0.349 
Detailed decomposition 
True composition effect         
Education 0.048 0.008 0.031 0.011 0.062 0.009 0.008 0.007 
Experience 0.032 0.016 -0.040 0.020 0.053 0.013 -0.100 0.030 
Occupation 0.066 0.013 0.166 0.026 0.021 0.009 0.096 0.025 
Other 0.055 0.034 0.187 0.043 0.061 0.029 0.052 0.052 
True wage structure effect         
Education 0.024 0.052 -0.219 0.052 -0.102 0.043 0.132 0.051 
Experience -0.436 0.121 -0.006 0.129 -0.268 0.118 0.304 0.127 
Occupation -0.020 0.025 -0.085 0.066 -0.012 0.020 -0.108 0.071 
Other 0.576 0.138 0.409 0.151 0.521 0.126 -0.107 0.155 
 
Notes: Decompositions are based on Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux’s (2007) approach (see equations 2 to 4). Yun’s (2005) 
procedure is used to ensure invariance of the results to the choice of the omitted category for categorical characteristics. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Croatian and Serbian LFS, 2008 and 2011. 
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Our estimated premiums for Serbia are similar to the results obtained for male and 
female employees by Nikolic (2014) by using the Serbian LFS data for 2008. Particularly, 
Nikolic (2014) has shown that the premium increased from close to zero in 2004 to 19 
percent for men and 12 percent for women in 2008 on average. The results from that 
study were obtained in an OLS regression after controlling for less observables than in 
our paper. Moreover, our results show a persistence of the public sector male premium, 
but considerable increase in the female premium during the financial crisis in Serbia. 
Additionally, in 2011 Serbian women became much more similar than men in terms of 
characteristics across sectors.  
 
Table 4 shows a decline in the female compositional effect in Serbia which led to a 
decline in the total (i.e., unconditional) gap in 2011 compared to 2008, despite the fact 
that the public sector premium measured by wage structure effect had doubled. These 
results imply changes in the composition of female jobs in the private sector during the 
crisis. Also, the results indicate that public sector workers not only enjoyed well-protected 
but also well-privileged jobs in terms of pay in spite of the introduced austerity measures. 
In contrast, the most vulnerable group were women employed by the private sector. On 
the other hand, the results for Croatia indicate an increase in both the composition and 
wage structure effect for females. This means that both the characteristics as well as 
returns to the characteristics for public sector female workers increased during the crisis, 
indicating once again stronger protection of workers in the public sector. However, this 
also suggests that private sector women were more hit by the crisis than men in terms of 
wages. 
 
Focusing on the detailed decompositions in Table 4, the results show the greatest 
importance of occupational differences between the two sectors in the composition effect 
for both Croatian and Serbian male and female workers, similarly as for the whole-
sample gap. In addition to better-paid occupations in the public than in the private 
sector, public sector workers on average also have higher educational qualifications and 
better-paid other characteristics than private sector workers. Moreover, even though the 
public sector has more higher-paid occupations, the returns to the same occupations are 
higher in the private sector for both Croatian and Serbian male and female workers, as is 
the case for the total gap. Additionally, public sector men and women in Croatia and 
public sector men in Serbia earned more in 2008 and less in 2011 for the same level of 
education than their private sector counterparts. The opposite holds for Serbian women. 
In particular, private sector women were paid more for the same educational 
qualification before the crisis, but less after the crisis. The returns to the remaining 
characteristics presented in Table 4 suggest that Serbian male workers were paid more in 
the private sector for the same level of experience than in the public sector, but less for 
other characteristics. More experienced male workers in Croatia had greater returns in the 
private sector in 2008, but lower returns in 2011. On the other hand, both Croatian and 
Serbian women were more rewarded for their experience in the public sector during the 
observed period.  
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5.4 Public-Private Sector Pay Gap across the Pay Distribution 
 
In the previous section we tested and confirmed that there was an average public-private 
sector earnings differential in Croatia and Serbia in the period before and after the 
financial crisis. In this section we obtain the estimates of the public-private sector pay gap 
at different points of the earnings distribution by estimating unconditional quantile 
regressions. This method provides a richer understanding of the data due to a more 
complete picture than OB decompositions at the mean. Obtaining estimates along the 
wage distribution is especially important when the public sector pay is expected to be 
more compressed relative to the private sector pay distribution. This means that the 
public sector tends to reduce pay inequality more than the private sector (see Table 2). 
Lausev (2014) shows greater public sector pay compression in transition than in 
developed countries. Moreover, we would also like to test for the changes in relative 
public-private wage distribution during the financial crisis. For this purpose, we analyze 
differences in characteristics (i.e., composition effect) and differences in returns to those 
characteristics (i.e., wage structure effect) between public and private sector workers by 
splitting the sample according to pay ranges into five quintiles. 
 
Before reporting the results of quantile decompositions of the total gap into the (true) 
composition and wage structure effects, we first briefly assess the appropriateness of the 
linearity assumption and the quality of reweighting (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). We 
note that the total error is generally larger than it was in the case of mean 
decompositions (reaching at some quantiles as much as 10 percentage points, both above 
and below zero) and that it is for all quantiles virtually completely due to 
misspecification of the wage regressions. This indicates that reweighting is more 
important for decompositions at quantiles than for those at the mean (Firpo, Fortin and 
Lemieux, 2007).  
 
We now turn to the results of quantile decompositions, shown in Figure 1. The total (i.e., 
unconditional) gap mainly declines as one moves towards the top of the pay distribution 
for both years and countries. Differences in characteristics between the two sectors are 
lower at the bottom than at the top of the wage distribution. This indicates that public 
sector workers have “better” job and personal characteristics than the private sector 
workers and these differences in characteristics are greater at the higher than at the lower 
end of the pay distribution.  
 
The conditional part of the differential presented in Figure 1 varies along the wage 
distribution according to the usual pattern observed in most of the countries. In 
particular, positive differences in returns to the same characteristics between public and 
private sectors decline with higher quantiles of the wage distribution. The wage-inequality 
reducing effect is present in both years and countries. This means that the public sector 
premium is largest below the median of the wage distribution and approaches zero or 
translates into a penalty at higher percentiles. 
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Although the previous section showed an average public sector premium in Croatia in 
the range of most EU countries, Figure 1 discloses a significantly higher premium at and 
below the median of the wage distribution. At the same time, top-paid workers in the 
public sector received substantially lower returns to the same characteristics when 
compared to their private sector counterparts. In particular, Figure 1 shows an increase in 
the public sector pay premium for workers at the 10th percentile from 16 percent in 2008 
to 20 percent in 2011 in Croatia. The public sector premium at the 25th percentile of the 
wage distribution in Croatia was almost 18 percent and remained unchanged between 
2008 and 2011. At the median, the public sector pay premium increased from 7 percent 
in 2008 to 13 percent in 2011. Workers at the 75th percentile of the wage distribution 
fared similar across sectors and those at the top (i.e., 90th) percentile incurred a 23 
percent pay penalty from having a public sector job during the whole observed period. 
This indicates a strong, competitive private sector that could pay significantly more than 
the public sector in Croatia which is not the case in Serbia. Namely, the Serbian public 
sector rewarded workers at the 10th and 25th percentiles in 2008 with returns that were 
more than a quarter higher than in the private sector. The same workers saw a small but 
further increase in their premium in 2011. The public sector premium for Serbian 
workers at the median remained similar over time at around 20 percent, while those at 
the 75th percentile lost their premium in 2011. Additionally, public sector workers at the 
90th percentile saw a decline in their penalty from 19 percent in 2008 to zero in 2011. 
 
Figure 1  Quantile Decompositions of the Public-Private Wage Gap 
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Notes: Decompositions are based on Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux’s (2007) approach (see equations 2 to 4). Yun’s (2005) 
procedure is used to ensure invariance of the results to the choice of the omitted category for categorical characteristics. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Croatian and Serbian LFS, 2008 and 2011. 
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Significant public sector pay premiums at the lower part, coupled with significant 
penalties at the higher part of the wage distribution in Croatia, indicate substantial 
compression of the public sector pay relative to the private sector. Since the premium 
increased the most at the median in 2011 relative to 2008, the crisis only brought an 
additional compression of public sector pay between the 50th and 90th percentiles. This 
may be the result of a decline (or slower increase) in private sector wages at and below the 
median while wages at higher percentiles remained unchanged or followed the changes in 
pay in the public sector. On the other hand, quantile regressions reveal that due to 
introduced austerity measures in the public sector, only workers at the 75th percentile in 
Serbia lost relative to their private sector counterparts. At lower percentiles, the decline in 
wage returns was greater in the private than in the public sector. For that reason, there 
was an increase in the public sector premium at and below the median in 2011 despite 
the government efforts to hold down public sector pay. Finally, this section also shows 
that the private sector in both countries competes with the public sector only for workers 
at the higher end of the wage distribution, while workers at and below the median collect 
large public sector pay premiums. 
 
 
6 Conclusions for Policy Implementation 
 
Despite the fact that Croatia and Serbia have chosen different ways to adjust to the crisis, 
the impact on the public-private sector wage gap in these two countries is similar when 
measured as a percentage increase between 2008 and 2011. The only major difference 
between these two countries is larger initial premium at the mean and across the wage 
distribution in Serbia than in Croatia which consequently causes greater increase in the 
pay gap in absolute terms. 
 
Given the relatively small average public sector premium, Croatian policy-makers have 
been more concerned with the revenue than with the expenditure side of the budget 
(measures such as VAT increase rather than public sector austerity measures). 
Consequently, the burden of the crisis was more absorbed by the private sector. In 
contrast, the implemented austerity (wage-freeze) measures in the public sector in Serbia 
were justified given the significantly higher public sector premium before the start of the 
crisis. Nevertheless, this paper finds a greater average public sector premium, i.e., returns 
to similar characteristics, at the end of the crisis than before the crisis in both countries. 
Moreover, unconditional quantile regressions applied in this paper raise a concern for 
policy-makers regarding overpaid public sector workers in both countries at lower parts 
of the pay-distribution.  
 
Particularly for Croatia, our work shows a significant public sector premium at and 
below the median of the wage distribution. On the other hand, there is a significant 
penalty for having a public sector job for workers at the top percentiles of the wage 
distribution. In this context, the public sector in Croatia suffers from pay compression 
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and may face difficulties in recruiting top-skilled workers while paying above-market 
returns to workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. 
 
On the other hand, our work on Serbia shows that real wage declines caused by pay-freeze 
measures in the public sector are coupled with even greater private sector wage cuts. Both 
public and private sectors seem to opt for a decline in wages rather than a decline in 
employment. This further widens the average sectoral gap. The same estimates by gender 
show that private sector women were more hit by the crisis than men. Furthermore, the 
estimates from unconditional quantile regressions suggest that public sector austerity 
measures caused a decline in the public sector premium to zero only for workers at the 
75th percentile of the wage distribution. The crisis led to further worsening in the living 
standard conditions especially for private sector workers at and below the median of the 
wage distribution. These workers were not only faced with greater job insecurity but also 
saw an increase in pay disadvantage when compared to workers with the same 
characteristics in the public sector.  
 
What are the policy implications that can be drawn from this paper? Given the explained 
wage privileges and large share of non-private (public) employment (over 40 percent), 
both employment and wage structure in the public sector put pressure on the 
sustainability of public finances. In Serbia, the increasing public sector wage premium 
presented in this paper sheds a light on workers’ flow efficiency between the public and 
private sectors and ability to finance public sector wages. In Croatia, further fiscal 
consolidation is also needed although the government has opted not to adjust public 
sector wages to the overall state of the economy in order to preserve the social dialogue 
with the trade unions. However, after joining the EU Croatia has to adhere to some 
supranational rules such as decreasing the budget deficit below 3 percent of the GDP in 
the next three years. Similar requirements await Serbia, but in a longer time period. This 
paper reveals a significant venue for policy-makers to explore in order to meet these 
demands by lowering public sector wages and/or employment. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1  Summary Statistics for Croatia 
2008 2011 
Public Private Public Private CRO 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Personal characteristics                 
Age 44.51 10.14 38.70 11.14 46.50 10.31 40.43 11.43 
Age2/1000 2.08 0.88 1.62 0.87 2.27 0.91 1.77 0.93 
Female 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.43 0.49 
Married 0.73 0.45 0.63 0.48 0.70 0.46 0.61 0.49 
Low-skilled 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.34 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32 
Medium-skilled 0.57 0.50 0.73 0.44 0.54 0.50 0.74 0.44 
High-skilled 0.31 0.46 0.13 0.33 0.33 0.47 0.14 0.35 
Master's and Doctor's 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.08 
Experience 21.66 10.58 16.10 11.12 23.16 10.98 17.31 11.61 
Experience2/1000 0.58 0.45 0.38 0.40 0.66 0.48 0.43 0.44 
Tenure 16.85 10.91 9.24 9.80 17.98 11.31 10.21 10.10 
Tenure2/1000 0.40 0.42 0.18 0.32 0.45 0.45 0.21 0.35 
Urban settlement 0.65 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.54 0.50 
Job characteristics                 
Manager 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.12 
Professional 0.17 0.38 0.06 0.24 0.27 0.44 0.08 0.27 
Technician 0.27 0.44 0.14 0.35 0.19 0.40 0.13 0.34 
Clerk 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.33 
Service and sales 0.09 0.28 0.19 0.39 0.10 0.30 0.23 0.42 
Agriculture 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.07 
Craftsman 0.10 0.31 0.18 0.38 0.08 0.27 0.16 0.37 
Plant/machine operator 0.08 0.27 0.19 0.39 0.07 0.26 0.18 0.38 
Elementary occupation 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 
Temporary contract 0.06 0.23 0.14 0.34 0.05 0.23 0.13 0.34 
Supervising 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.33 
Small firm (<50) 0.37 0.48 0.53 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.56 0.50 
Medium firm (50-200) 0.28 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.45 0.21 0.41 
Large firm (>200) 0.35 0.48 0.23 0.42 0.33 0.47 0.23 0.42 
Manufacturing 0.10 0.30 0.35 0.48 0.08 0.27 0.34 0.47 
Construction 0.03 0.17 0.12 0.33 0.02 0.15 0.10 0.30 
Wholesale and retail 
trade... 0.02 0.13 0.25 0.43 0.01 0.12 0.23 0.42 
Transport, storage... 0.11 0.31 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.28 
Financial intermediation... 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.19 
Zagreb 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38 
Northwest (without Zagreb) 0.16 0.36 0.25 0.43 0.16 0.37 0.24 0.43 
Central and Eastern Croatia 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 
Adriatic 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.33 0.47 
Wages/hours worked                 
Usual hours per week 40.66 2.43 41.82 4.09 40.58 2.42 41.26 3.35 
Nominal monthly wage 4616.16 1644.79 3939.40 2238.56 5082.04 1862.89 4142.63 2324.61 
Real monthly wage (HRK) 4773.69 1700.92 4073.83 2314.96 4967.78 1821.00 4049.49 2272.35 
Log hourly wage 3.26 0.34 3.04 0.42 3.30 0.34 3.05 0.41 
No. of observations 2194 3099 1640 2286 
 
Source: Croatian LFS, 2008 and 2011. 
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Table A2  Summary Statistics for Serbia 
2008 2011 
Public Private Public Private SRB 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Personal characteristics                 
Age 43.25 9.95 38.50 10.69 44.63 10.07 40.06 10.70 
Age2/1000 19.69 8.38 15.97 8.42 20.93 8.79 17.19 8.67 
Female 0.48 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.42 0.49 
Married 0.74 0.44 0.65 0.48 0.72 0.45 0.65 0.48 
Low-skilled 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 
Medium-skilled 0.56 0.50 0.73 0.45 0.55 0.50 0.74 0.44 
High-skilled 0.33 0.47 0.14 0.34 0.33 0.47 0.15 0.36 
Master's and Doctor's 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.08 
Experience 19.52 10.31 14.94 10.72 19.88 10.39 15.35 10.88 
Experience2/1000 4.87 4.03 3.38 3.77 5.03 4.13 3.54 3.91 
Tenure 15.68 10.63 8.67 9.36 16.41 10.67 9.35 9.22 
Tenure2/1000 3.59 3.85 1.63 2.95 3.83 3.95 1.72 3.01 
Urban settlement 0.69 0.46 0.63 0.48 0.68 0.47 0.64 0.48 
Job characteristics                 
Manager 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 
Professional 0.21 0.41 0.06 0.24 0.21 0.41 0.07 0.25 
Technician 0.27 0.45 0.13 0.34 0.26 0.44 0.14 0.34 
Clerk 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 
Service and sales 0.09 0.28 0.25 0.43 0.10 0.29 0.25 0.43 
Agriculture 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.11 
Craftsman 0.10 0.30 0.23 0.42 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.40 
Plant/machine operator 0.07 0.26 0.13 0.34 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.35 
Elementary occupation 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26 
Temporary contract 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.29 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.32 
Supervising 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.36 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.35 
Small firm (<50) 0.65 0.48 0.80 0.40 0.65 0.48 0.81 0.39 
Medium firm (50-250) 0.24 0.43 0.14 0.35 0.24 0.43 0.12 0.33 
Large firm (>250) 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.24 
Manufacturing 0.11 0.31 0.36 0.48 0.10 0.29 0.36 0.48 
Construction 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.28 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.25 
Wholesale and retail 
trade... 
0.02 0.15 0.29 0.45 0.02 0.14 0.27 0.44 
Transport, storage... 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23 0.10 0.31 0.08 0.27 
Financial intermed. ... 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.19 
Belgrade 0.27 0.44 0.20 0.40 0.27 0.45 0.22 0.42 
Vojvodina 0.21 0.41 0.31 0.46 0.20 0.40 0.29 0.45 
Sumadija & West Serbia 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.50 
Wages/hours worked                 
Usual hours per week 41.00 3.36 44.17 6.74 40.95 3.51 43.80 5.92 
Nominal monthly wage 30222.6 23516.2 23312.0 26894.9 33878.4 17143.0 26356.1 17130.8 
Real monthly wage (RSD) 34648.3 26959.88 26725.8 30833.3 29513.4 14934.3 22960.3 14923.6 
Log hourly wage 5.16 0.54 4.79 0.61 5.02 0.51 4.69 0.53 
No. of observations 2015 2401 2027 2438 
 
Source: Serbian LFS, 2008 and 2011. 
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Table A3  Pooled Regression Results 
CROATIA SERBIA 
Pooled 
2008 2011 2008 2011 
 Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Public sector  0.046*** 0.011 0.071*** 0.012 0.136*** 0.020 0.145*** 0.018 
Personal 
characteristics         
Age 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.010 0.007 
Age2/1000 -0.050 0.051 -0.039 0.056 -0.009 0.009 -0.014 0.008 
Female -0.149*** 0.009 -0.166*** 0.010 -0.151*** 0.016 -0.107*** 0.015 
Married 0.015 0.010 0.0271* 0.011 0.011 0.018 -0.001 0.016 
Medium-skilled – ref.         
Low-skilled -0.105*** 0.014 -0.090*** 0.016 -0.133*** 0.025 -0.104*** 0.024 
High-skilled 0.153*** 0.015 0.108*** 0.017 0.218*** 0.026 0.177*** 0.022 
Master's and Doctor's 0.333*** 0.042 0.266*** 0.039 0.483*** 0.101 0.538*** 0.063 
Experience 0.008** 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Experience2/1000 -0.102 0.060 -0.014 0.063 0.002 0.011 -0.004 0.009 
Tenure 0.002 0.002 0.005** 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Tenure2/1000 -0.070 0.044 -0.103* 0.047 -0.010 0.009 0.000 0.008 
Urban settlement 0.049*** 0.009 0.025* 0.010 0.037* 0.016 0.029* 0.014 
Job characteristics         
Technician – ref.         
Manager 0.357*** 0.034 0.352*** 0.039 0.186*** 0.048 0.126** 0.042 
Professional 0.130*** 0.017 0.189*** 0.020 0.174*** 0.031 0.102*** 0.027 
Clerk -0.142*** 0.015 -0.097*** 0.017 -0.096** 0.030 -0.158*** 0.027 
Service & sales -0.271*** 0.015 -0.223*** 0.017 -0.286*** 0.027 -0.285*** 0.024 
Agriculture -0.345*** 0.044 -0.218*** 0.053 -0.110 0.106 -0.408*** 0.071 
Craftsman -0.209*** 0.016 -0.152*** 0.019 -0.202*** 0.028 -0.210*** 0.026 
Plant/machine operator -0.267*** 0.017 -0.205*** 0.018 -0.157*** 0.031 -0.162*** 0.027 
Elementary -0.369*** 0.019 -0.292*** 0.021 -0.283*** 0.031 -0.347*** 0.030 
Temporary contract -0.074*** 0.014 -0.097*** 0.016 -0.173*** 0.029 -0.212*** 0.025 
Supervising 0.077*** 0.014 0.149*** 0.014 0.128*** 0.021 0.144*** 0.019 
Small firm – ref.         
Medium firm 0.031** 0.010 0.015 0.011 0.042* 0.019 0.036* 0.018 
Large firm 0.069*** 0.010 0.061*** 0.011 0.117*** 0.027 0.119*** 0.025 
Manufacturing -0.059*** 0.013 -0.075*** 0.015 -0.074** 0.024 -0.055* 0.021 
Construction 0.005 0.017 -0.020 0.020 -0.042 0.036 -0.077* 0.034 
Wholesale and retail... -0.033* 0.014 -0.060*** 0.016 -0.078** 0.026 -0.034 0.024 
Transport, storage... 0.110*** 0.016 0.073*** 0.016 -0.021 0.029 -0.012 0.025 
Financial intermed. ... 0.150*** 0.026 0.166*** 0.028 0.284*** 0.050 0.188*** 0.043 
Zagreb – ref.         
Northwest Cro. -0.048*** 0.013 -0.074*** 0.015       
Central and Eastern Cro. -0.122*** 0.012 -0.147*** 0.014       
Adriatic Cro. -0.023* 0.012 -0.062*** 0.013       
Sumad. & W. Serb – ref.         
Belgrade      0.323*** 0.019 0.192*** 0.016 
Vojvodina        0.091*** 0.018 0.070*** 0.016 
Constant 3.133*** 0.075 3.182*** 0.085 4.773*** 0.136 4.593*** 0.120 
Adjusted R-squared 0.529 0.560 0.379 0.372 
F 181.4 152.4 85.3 83.7 
Observations 5293 3926 4416 4465 
 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Croatian and Serbian LFS, 2008 and 2011. 
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Table A4  Wage Regressions for Croatia 
2008 2011 
CRO 
Public Private Public Private 
Personal characteristics Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.006 -0.017* 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Age2/1000 -0.085 0.070 -0.017 0.075 0.148 0.077 -0.088 0.082 
Female -0.107*** 0.012 -0.169*** 0.012 -0.131*** 0.013 -0.178*** 0.014 
Married 0.043*** 0.012 -0.001 0.014 0.024 0.013 0.026 0.015 
Medium skilled – ref.         
Low-skilled -0.133*** 0.020 -0.079*** 0.018 -0.069** 0.022 -0.098*** 0.022 
High-skilled 0.151*** 0.016 0.142*** 0.024 0.100*** 0.021 0.118*** 0.025 
Master's and Doctor's 0.320*** 0.040 0.441*** 0.092 0.361*** 0.041 0.082 0.080 
Experience 0.001 0.004 0.009* 0.003 0.017*** 0.004 0.000 0.004 
Experience2/1000 0.005 0.079 -0.126 0.087 -0.266** 0.085 0.095 0.091 
Tenure 0.008*** 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006* 0.003 
Tenure2/1000 -0.151** 0.057 -0.044 0.068 -0.016 0.060 -0.142 0.073 
Urban 0.032** 0.012 0.058*** 0.013 0.026* 0.013 0.022 0.014 
Job characteristics         
Technician – ref.         
Manager 0.294*** 0.037 0.466*** 0.057 0.234*** 0.048 0.474*** 0.058 
Professional 0.099*** 0.018 0.215*** 0.030 0.182*** 0.022 0.215*** 0.033 
Clerk -0.146*** 0.018 -0.115*** 0.023 -0.085*** 0.020 -0.088*** 0.026 
Service & sales -0.192*** 0.021 -0.278*** 0.022 -0.188*** 0.023 -0.227*** 0.024 
Agriculture -0.222*** 0.049 -0.433*** 0.072 -0.193*** 0.057 -0.266** 0.094 
Craftsman -0.158*** 0.021 -0.214*** 0.023 -0.133*** 0.027 -0.141*** 0.026 
Plant/machine operator -0.176*** 0.023 -0.282*** 0.023 -0.133*** 0.027 -0.210*** 0.025 
Elementary -0.363*** 0.023 -0.358*** 0.028 -0.326*** 0.026 -0.259*** 0.031 
Temporary contract -0.114*** 0.024 -0.057** 0.017 -0.179*** 0.027 -0.066** 0.020 
Supervising 0.065*** 0.016 0.100*** 0.021 0.114*** 0.018 0.178*** 0.021 
Small firm – ref.         
Medium firm 0.013 0.013 0.038** 0.014 0.009 0.014 0.008 0.016 
Large firm 0.064*** 0.013 0.084*** 0.015 0.060*** 0.014 0.066*** 0.016 
Manufacturing -0.090*** 0.019 -0.015 0.018 -0.082*** 0.023 -0.051** 0.020 
Construction -0.032 0.031 0.036 0.022 -0.015 0.037 -0.012 0.026 
Wholesale and retail... 0.037 0.038 -0.011 0.017 0.039 0.048 -0.049* 0.019 
Transport, storage... 0.052** 0.018 0.185*** 0.028 0.029 0.020 0.101*** 0.026 
Financial intermed. ... 0.113** 0.044 0.163*** 0.034 0.097* 0.046 0.179*** 0.036 
Zagreb – ref.         
Northwest Cro. 0.013 0.018 -0.086*** 0.019 -0.006 0.020 -0.116*** 0.022 
Central and East. Cro. -0.045** 0.015 -0.186*** 0.018 -0.054** 0.017 -0.213*** 0.021 
Adriatic Cro. -0.019 0.014 -0.0235 0.017 -0.038* 0.017 -0.073*** 0.019 
Constant 3.047*** 0.115 3.176*** 0.103 3.558*** 0.131 3.112*** 0.117 
Adjusted R-squared 0.554 0.488 0.581 0.498 
F 86.03 93.41 72.08 71.80 
Observations 2194 3099 1640 2286 
 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Croatian LFS, 2008 and 2011. 
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Table A5  Wage Regressions for Serbia 
2008 2011 
SRB 
Public Private Public Private 
Personal characteristics Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age -0.001 0.012 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.017 0.009 
Age2/1000 -0.002 0.014 -0.005 0.013 -0.001 0.012 -0.024* 0.011 
Female -0.135*** 0.023 -0.153*** 0.024 -0.095*** 0.021 -0.100*** 0.021 
Married 0.034 0.025 -0.006 0.025 -0.024 0.022 0.015 0.023 
Medium skilled – ref.         
Low-skilled -0.166*** 0.038 -0.101** 0.032 -0.166*** 0.036 -0.051 0.032 
High-skilled 0.281*** 0.032 0.109** 0.040 0.179*** 0.029 0.150*** 0.035 
Master's and Doctor's 0.532*** 0.102 0.355 0.290 0.542*** 0.072 0.517*** 0.123 
Experience -0.006 0.007 0.0115* 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 
Experience2/1000 0.019 0.016 -0.004 0.015 -0.005 0.013 -0.006 0.013 
Tenure 0.009* 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 
Tenure2/1000 -0.017 0.012 -0.005 0.014 0.005 0.012 -0.001 0.012 
Urban 0.038 0.023 0.0464* 0.022 0.035 0.020 0.024 0.020 
Job characteristics         
Technician – ref.         
Manager 0.186** 0.062 0.266*** 0.071 0.147** 0.056 0.108 0.063 
Professional 0.0760* 0.035 0.364*** 0.057 0.107*** 0.033 0.079 0.048 
Clerk -0.112** 0.038 -0.059 0.047 -0.120*** 0.035 -0.191*** 0.041 
Service & sales -0.234*** 0.040 -0.277*** 0.039 -0.202*** 0.037 -0.328*** 0.034 
Agriculture 0.032 0.159 -0.154 0.142 -0.285* 0.126 -0.437*** 0.090 
Craftsman -0.101* 0.041 -0.234*** 0.040 -0.170*** 0.039 -0.225*** 0.035 
Plant/machine operator -0.177*** 0.045 -0.151*** 0.044 -0.107** 0.040 -0.188*** 0.038 
Elementary -0.319*** 0.040 -0.236*** 0.047 -0.367*** 0.040 -0.291*** 0.045 
Temporary contract -0.185*** 0.049 -0.177*** 0.037 -0.223*** 0.042 -0.205*** 0.031 
Supervising 0.115*** 0.027 0.132*** 0.031 0.165*** 0.025 0.121*** 0.029 
Small firm – ref.         
Medium firm 0.020 0.024 0.0744* 0.031 0.032 0.022 0.037 0.029 
Large firm 0.091** 0.034 0.161*** 0.043 0.136*** 0.031 0.094* 0.040 
Manufacturing -0.264*** 0.035 0.040 0.034 -0.176*** 0.035 0.009 0.030 
Construction 0.011 0.072 0.001 0.045 -0.023 0.063 -0.058 0.044 
Wholesale and retail... 0.003 0.067 -0.008 0.032 -0.223*** 0.066 0.030 0.029 
Transport, storage... -0.024 0.035 0.024 0.051 -0.007 0.031 0.020 0.041 
Financial intermed. ... 0.246** 0.082 0.357*** 0.065 0.254*** 0.076 0.212*** 0.054 
Sumad. & W. Serb – ref.         
Belgrade 0.221*** 0.024 0.430*** 0.028 0.110*** 0.022 0.282*** 0.024 
Vojvodina 0.042 0.026 0.122*** 0.024 0.067** 0.024 0.071** 0.022 
Constant 5.127*** 0.223 4.686*** 0.179 4.915*** 0.194 4.439*** 0.162 
Adjusted R-squared 0.341 0.331 0.376 0.278 
F 34.65 39.23 40.37 31.32 
Observations 2015 2401 2027 2438 
 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Serbian LFS, 2008 and 2011. 
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Figure A1  True Composition and Wage Structure Effects and the Decomposition of the Total 
Error into the Reweighting and Misspecification Errors 
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Notes: Decompositions are based on Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux’s (2007) approach (see equations 2 to 4). Yun’s (2005) 
procedure is used to ensure invariance of the results to the choice of the omitted category for categorical characteristics. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Croatian and Serbian LFS, 2008 and 2011. 
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